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Abstract
The impact of intellectual property rights in particular patent 
relating to public health has posed numerous challenges faced by 
developing countries who are members of World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). This paper examines the impact of TRIPS Agreement (Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights) in relation to developing 
countries in general with specifi cation made to India. Signifi cant 
changes brought about by the TRIPS fl exibilities in particular usage 
of compulsory licensing and Bolar provision have to a certain extent 
benefi ted the developing countries in the fi eld of public health during 
national emergency. The TRIPS fl exibilities by way of amendment 
have helped countries that (do not possess manufacturing 
capacities) to import medicines. Some developing countries even 
utilised TRIPS fl exibilities in an aggressive manner to enforce their 
right to have access to medicines from other countries for the benefi t 
of their citizens. Further, TRIPs fl exibilities have helped developing 
countries to manufacture generic products to make it affordable to 
the people. This paper specifi cally examines the impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement on Indian generic pharmaceutical industry and the 
legal challenges faced by Indian pharmaceutical industry after the 
implementation of product patent regime effective from 1 January 
2005. The Patent Amendment Act 2005(India) will be looked into 
especially on the controversy in respect of Section 3(d) of the Patent 
Amendment Act 2005(India) on the requirement of patentability. 
The new Section 92A of the Patent Amendment Act 2005(India) 
on the grounds to invoke compulsory licensing will be analysed to 
see whether Indian government has applied restrictive or broad 
approach, as compulsory licensing is certainly an important legal 
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weapon for India to manufacture affordable generic medicines. 
The current challenges faced by India on data exclusivity provision 
often described as the TRIPS PLUS standard is impliedly stated in 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement on undisclosed information. 
India needs to achieve legal certainty in complying with the TRIPS 
Agreement and also bearing in mind the TRIPS-PLUS standards 
before adopting those TRIPS provisions into its patent law legislation 
in order to promote innovation and to achieve public health as well 
as to serve the interest of the developing countries.
Keywords: TRIPS fl exibilities, Compulsory Licensing, Article 
39.3 on undisclosed information, Indian Patent Act 1970, Patent 
Amendment Act 2005: Section 3(d), pre and post grant opposition
Introduction
Modern science and technology medicine have made available many 
new drugs to cure and manage various ailments. Unfortunately, the 
question is on the drugs people can afford which are too expensive 
for individuals and governments to buy. Apart from that, there is also 
intellectual property concern and patented medicines.2 According 
to Christophe Weber, GlaxoSmithKline’s senior vice president and 
regional director of Asia Pacifi c, one of the challenges faced is the 
higher prices of drugs due to the pharmaceutical industry’s research 
and development business model.3 The essential point relevant 
to the initial introduction is access to affordable medicines in the 
developing countries through generic competition and access to 
cheaper medicines of assured quality.4 
In relation to this study, the author will be looking into mainly the 
legal analysis in the context of TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights) and the adoption and implementation of TRIPS 
Agreement into the national patent law of developing countries. 
Compulsory licensing use by developing countries like Thailand, 
Brazil, Malaysia will be looked into as well. These countries are 
chosen because they have used the system of compulsory licensing 
2 The Star Newspaper, national edition (Malaysia). 2010. December 19.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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either to manufacture or import generic medicines. Compulsory 
licensing is a mechanism allowed under TRIPS which increases 
access to generic drugs.5 The actual essence of the TRIPS Agreement 
will be analysed, as to whether TRIPS is a legal weapon to protect 
the right of the patentee exclusively balancing between patent holder 
rights and public health objectives in relation to accessibility and 
affordability of medicines in the developing countries.
In addition, other challenges that will be faced by developing 
countries such as India are whether there is suffi cient technology 
transfer in relation to pharmaceutical patent referring to Article 66.2 
of the TRIPS Agreement which encourages member countries to 
promote technology transfer. The patentee who wishes to establish 
manufacturing plant in producing pharmaceutical products must be 
willing to conduct knowledge transfer in terms of medical innovation 
and mere setting up the manufacturing plant is not suffi cient. The 
three (3) requirements of obtaining a patent or patentability such as 
novelty, inventive step and capable of industrial application must 
be looked into.  The three (3) requirements of patentability are 
very much related to the issue of evergreening of patent as member 
countries are given much fl exibility to draft their own patent law 
according to their need in terms of economic and technological 
development. The requirement of patentability should not merely 
follow the guidance under the TRIPS Agreement on Article 27(1) 
but should be implemented according to the needs of each member 
state in a reasonable manner.
Besides that, the pre and post grant opposition need to be looked into 
revocation and granting the patent itself is not given much attention 
compared to the limitation to the exclusive rights of patent holder such 
as the TRIPS fl exibilities. In the author’s view, discrimination should 
be avoided in the interest of developing countries when it comes 
to determining the grounds to invoke the compulsory licensing as 
the national sovereignty in the usage of TRIPS fl exibilities should 
be respected by the big pharmaceutical companies (North 
counterpart). 
5 Can TRIPS Deliver, Patent Pills and Public Health, ed. Martin Foreman, in the 
Panos Institute, dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14574/1/... 
(accessed April 20, 2013).
54
Although price factor is highly a signifi cant one, however in order 
to achieve a balance between affordability of medicines and medical 
innovation is certainly a challenging one. The implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement into the domestic patent legislation at least provides 
hope for the developing countries in terms of the technology transfer 
which will enable the domestic generic pharmaceutical industry to 
sustain in the production of new medicines.6 In the author’s view, 
strong will of the country to promote healthy competition between 
generic and big pharmaceutical companies to ensure accessibility 
and affordability to serve the public interest can be shown in the 
implementation of TRIPS fl exibilities such as compulsory licensing 
and Bolar provision effectively.
It is certainly important to take note of the implied exception under 
Article 39(3) which states that members shall protect such data 
against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public or 
unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against 
unfair commercial use.  In the author’s view, the stringent condition 
imposed in Article 39(3) on the data exclusivity against disclosure 
and trade secret of the invention itself can be prevented with the 
effective implementation of the Bolar provision and compulsory 
licensing in the patent law itself, being one of the TRIPS fl exibilities 
will facilitate the weaknesses that existed in the Article 39(3). 
The effective utilization of Bolar provision or said as regulatory 
provision can be seen from Canada’s experience itself as The 
World Trade Organisation Panel in Canada on Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical Products decided that this provision, allowing limited 
exceptions, covered a provision of Canadian law which permits the 
use by generic producers of patented products, without authorization 
and prior to the expiry of the patent term, for the purposes of seeking 
regulatory approval from public health authorities for the marketing 
of their generic version as soon as the patent expires.7  
6 Quaker International Affairs Programme, How Strong Patent Protection Affects 
Access to Medicines Patents, ed. Jonanthan Hepburn, in the Ottawa and Quaker 
United National Offi ce Geneva, http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.
htm (accessed April 20, 2013).
7 World Trade Organisation, “Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm (accessed 
April 1, 2013).
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The TRIPS Agreement Related to Access of Medicines on Public 
Health Matters
Under this heading, the relationship between TRIPS Agreement and 
public health will be analysed. First and foremost, Article 30 of the 
TRIPS Agreement will be looked into, which provides for limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably confl ict with the exploitation 
of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the interest of the 
patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of the 
third parties.8 The issue that the author would like to address 
is on what is actually meant by “do not unreasonably confl ict 
with a normal exploitation of a patent and also the statement on 
‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent owner.  A 
question is bound to arise here as to what is meant by the reasonable 
means to be taken by generic companies who wishes to exercise 
their rights. 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement indicates that generic 
companies have to negotiate with the patent holder on case to case 
basis according to their needs. Furthermore, if we read Article 
30 provision on ‘taking account of the legitimate interest of third 
parties carefully,’ it implies to the author that a strict approach 
is imposed with less signifi cance imposed  on the rights of third 
parties such as the generic pharmaceutical companies who wishes 
to exploit the patented invention as the main objective of Article 30 
should focus on the limitation of the right given to the patent owner 
and clearly explain the if the negotiations fails between generic 
producer and patentee and then Article 30 can be disregarded. 
Besides, we can also state that Article 30 is the fi rst provision of 
TRIPS Agreement that initiates the exceptions to the monopoly 
rights given to the patentee. Subsequently, the importance on the 
limitation of the rights of the patentee can be further appreciated and 
seen in the important provision of Article 31 on the other use without 
authorisation of the right holder, which is often called as compulsory 
licensing. Under Article 31, government may issue a compulsory 
licensing authorising third party to produce generic drugs without 
8 Paul Goldstein, International Legal Materials on Intellectual Property (United 
States: Foundation Press, 2006), 14. 
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authorisation of the patent holder where negotiations fail to obtain 
authorisation on reasonable commercial terms.9 
The compulsory licensing provision under Article 31 is certainly 
an important legal weapon in relation to access to medicines in 
developing countries including India which is frequently discussed 
by different researchers and authors in relation to patent protection, 
TRIPS and developing countries.10 As many developing countries 
do not have the capacity to manufacture generic drugs and TRIPS 
has given some fl exibilities for countries lacking manufacturing 
capacity by having TRIPS Declaration on Paragraph 6 which 
acknowledges the inadequacy of manufacturing capacity with 
respect to compulsory licensing. Referring to paragraph 6, which 
states that ‘We recognise WTO members with insuffi cient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
diffi culties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS Agreement and we instruct the Council for TRIPS to 
fi nd an expeditious solution to this problem. Paragraph 6 waives an 
exporter’s Article 31(f) obligation to supply predominantly to the 
domestic market, enabling any country with manufacturing capacity 
to issue a compulsory licence to produce generic drugs for export to 
countries that have insuffi cient or manufacturing capacity, subject 
to several conditions.11 However, in order to invoke Article 31(f) 
waiver to produce generic medicines, a proper implementation of 
compulsory licensing provision is important. 
Compulsory Licensing: A Potent Legal Weapon
Frederick M. Abbott, an eminent scholar in the fi eld of International 
Law defi nes compulsory license as a ‘legal vehicle whereby a 
government grant to itself or to a third party the right to manufacture 
or to import patented product without authorisation of the patent 
holder or the right holder’.12 Importantly, the question raises on 
9 Bradly J Condon and Tapen Sinha, Global Lessons from the AIDS Pandemic: 
Economic, Financial, Legal and Political Implications (Germany: Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008), 14.
10 Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS 
Agreement (New York: Rutledge Warwick Studies in Globalisation, 2002), 121.
11 Condon and Sinha, Global Lessons from the AIDS Pandemic, n. 9 at 14.
12 Frederick M Abott and Rudolf V.Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for 
Public Health: A Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha 
Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision (World Bank Working Paper No. 61 Global 
HIV/AIDS Programme, 2005), 35.
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which ground of public health problems compulsory licensing can be 
issued and paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration is given main priority 
on the public health problems and applied to the main utilisation 
of compulsory licensing. The defi nition on public health problems 
as recognised in paragraph 1 of the Declaration provides that: ‘We 
the Doha Ministerial Conference recognise the gravity of the public 
health problems affl icting many developing and least developed 
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics.13 Importantly, public health problems 
or scope of diseases of developing and least-developed country 
members are not limited to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics.14 
According to paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration which states 
‘each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency and further 
expressly acknowledges that HIV/AIDS can constitute a national 
emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency.15 The issues that 
need to be addressed are whether on the conditions relating to 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, whether it should include 
non-communicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes, heart and 
lung disease which are said to be the 21st century’s greatest health 
challenge.16 At the press conference to preview UN summit in 
September, John Seffrin the chief executive offi cer of the American 
Cancer Society said that by 2030 non-communicable diseases were 
expected to cause fi ve times as many deaths as communicable diseases 
world-wide. Furthermore, as stated by the UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon international community had focused on communicable 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, and four main 
non-communicable diseases have emerged relatively unnoticed in 
the developing world which are now becoming global epidemic.17 
In order to have a clear and straightforward legal implementation of 
compulsory licensing provision or to make compulsory licensing an 
important legal weapon, the basic grounds on the scope of diseases in 
achieving the overall objective of health problems should be clearly 
13 Abott and Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health, 35.
14 Abott and Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health, 35.
15 Abott and Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health, 35. 
16 The Star Newspaper, national edition.2011.June 22.
17 Ibid.
58
addressed without being ambiguous or causing further procedural 
diffi culties to the generic companies to manufacture medicines for 
the need of domestic market and other developing countries. 
Compulsory licensing need to be used aggressively with a clear 
adoption of the requirement concisely as possible into the national 
patent legislation in order to address overall health problems that 
leads to death which affects the global economy. Importantly, in 
relation to the TRIPS Agreement one of the signifi cant fl exibilities 
can be seen in the Doha Declaration on paragraph 5(b) which states 
‘each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are 
granted.18 So grounds on compulsory licensing should not be used 
restrictively.19 As we can observe, compulsory license is often 
issued only when patented invention is not available to the public 
at a reasonable price and on the grounds of working the patented 
invention for the domestic generic pharmaceutical industry.  
A Case Study on India: Is India Fully Utilising Compulsory 
Licensing or Undermining the Usage?
Referring to the case study on India, compulsory licensing is so far 
only used for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical 
products to the country having insuffi cient or no manufacturing 
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product in 
order to address public health problems.20 For instance, the author is 
of the view that data relating to compulsory licenses for the use in 
India is not available, which will be addressed later in the process 
of author’s thesis on the reason why India has not invoke other 
grounds such as reasonably requirement of the public, invention 
not available to the public at a reasonable affordable price, and 
national working of patent when it was explicitly allowed in the 
Patent Act 1970 and Patent Amendment Act 1999. Referring back 
to the compulsory licensing granted during the public health crisis 
18 Frederick M. Abott; “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health: Lighting A Dark Corner At The WTO,” Journal of International 
Economic Law 469 5, no. 2 (2002): 469.
19 Abott, “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” 469.  
20 Kalyan C Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice (India: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 180.
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in Malaysia, Thailand and Ghana, India had issued compulsory 
licensing for export which can be seen in the amendment of Patent 
Amendment Act 2005(India), as the decision on para 6 of the Doha 
Declaration which permitted WTO members to allow export of 
pharmaceutical product to other developing and underdeveloped 
countries not having manufacturing capacities to deal with the 
public health problems can be seen in the new section 92A in the 
Patent Amendment Act 2005(India) for compulsory licensing for 
export of patented pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional 
circumstances.21
In relation to compulsory licensing for export in India being exporting 
country, Thailand granted a compulsory licence for importation and 
local production of efavirenz used for ARV therapy and the licence 
was granted by Thailand Ministry of Health on 29 November 2006 
and initially royalty proposed for patent holder was 0.5 percent. After 
the grant of compulsory licence, Ranbaxy, an Indian pharmaceutical 
company supplied amount of 66,000 bottles of the generic version 
of efavirenz to Thailand. Importantly, the issuance of the licence 
by the government at a reduced cost of ARV drugs by 50 percent 
and increase the accessibility to 20,000 persons was well received. 
Subsequently, companies like Merck reduced the cost of the price of 
their ARV drugs.22 
Compulsory licensing is said to be an important legal tool to ensure 
access to affordable medicines and its importance and usage were 
reaffi rmed in the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health. By way of making reference to the Thailand’s 
Patent Act 1999 in comparison with the Indian Patent Act 1970, 
the Thailand Patent Act 1999 in Section 51 states that any ministry, 
bureau or department of the Government may, by themselves or 
through others, exercise the compulsory licensing right “ in order 
to carry out any service for public consumption or which is of vital 
importance to the defense of the  country or for the preservation or 
realisation of natural resources or the environment or to prevent or 
relieve a severe shortage of foods, drugs or other consumption items 
21 The Patents ( Amendment Act 2005) <http::ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.
htm> (accessed July 6, 2011)
22 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 183. 
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or for any other public service.23 Another example when Malaysia 
granted a compulsory licensing on antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for 
treatment of AIDS on 29 September 2004, authorisation being valid 
for two years whereby involving importation of listed drugs such 
as didanosine (100 mg), didanosine (25mg), zidovudine (100mg) 
and lamivudine+zidovudine(150mg) from Cipla, India.24 After the 
grant of compulsory licence the cost of ARV drugs reduced by 
81 per cent and the treatment programme of the government was 
increased to 4,000 patients from 1,500 patients. The compulsory 
licence granted by the Malaysian government proved to be effective 
for implementing the AIDS treatment programme and making drugs 
more accessible.25
In the author’s view, respective country concerned should use 
compulsory licensing as a potent or a powerful legal weapon to meet 
their public health objectives, as we can see the example of Malaysia 
on the importation of AIDS drugs is concerned. India being the 
major exporter of pharmaceutical drugs to the developing countries 
and having a strong generic pharmaceutical industry should utilise 
the compulsory licensing mechanism to the development of the 
generic pharmaceutical industry as in terms of improving the 
technology transfer and not merely focusing for export purposes, 
and affordability of medicines.  
The reason is because India needs a suffi cient technology transfer 
from developed countries which are the original patent holder. In 
order to have self reliant domestic generic pharmaceutical industry 
and capability to develop new chemical entities without relying on 
reverse engineering, the invention of a suffi cient technology transfer 
becomes very vital. For instance, grounds to invoke compulsory 
licencing such as reasonable requirement of the public are not 
satisfi ed on whether development of commercial activities in India is 
prejudiced ( referring to Section 90A), and on grounds invention not 
being worked in India which will assist the generic pharmaceutical 
23 Third World Network, “Thailand Issues compulsory licence for cheaper AIDS 
Drugs,” 2006.
http://www.twnside.org.sg11P_health_reports.htm (accessed July 5, 2011). 
24 See http://www.cpteh.org/ip/health/c/malaysia/arv-licence.html (accessed July 
5, 2011).
25 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 182. 
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industry.26 The grounds of compulsory licensing should address 
effective transfer of technology and one way is through national 
working of patent as 3 years period given to invoke as to monitor 
whether invention is worked effectively and not neglecting the fact 
on the 3 years period which is said to be too lengthy. As through the 
observation on the grounds for compulsory licensing for government 
use such as national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency is frequently used and the question is whether because of 
the reaffi rmation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health. Besides that though Articles 7,8 and 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement clearly intend to extend social benefi ts of patents 
to areas other than those provided under the Paris Convention, 
however as authorised by Article 5A each member has the right to 
adopt legislative measures to prevent abuses  of a patent holder’s 
exclusive rights.27 Although term of failure of work is not to be 
clearly defi ned by the Paris Convention,28  the national patent law 
of respective country’s legislation can interpret ‘failure to work’ 
in their own defi nition as failure to transfer technology to generic 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Compulsory Licensing in India: The Most Comprehensive Non-
Voluntary Licensing System
Compulsory licensing under the Indian patent law is said to be the 
most comprehensive non-voluntary licensing system in the world.29 
For instance, this statement applies especially to section 84, as the 
compulsory licence may be granted to prevent abusive practices 
by patent holder or to prevent patent holder using patents to block 
commercial exploitation of the patented invention. The law in India 
allows any person to apply for a compulsory licence due to a failure 
to work the patented invention in India in three years from date 
of issuance of patent. The burden of proof lies with the applicant 
26 Patent Offi ce India, “The Patents Act 1970 (39 of 1970) (As Amended By the 
Patents Amendment Act 1999 :effective from 1st 1995, http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/
patent/patents.htm (accessed July 5, 2011).  
27 Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Rights in Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries: Major 
Challenges or the Future (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 34.
28 Kuanpoth, Rights in Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries: Major 
Challenges or the Future, 31.
29 Kuanpoth, Rights in Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries: Major 
Challenges or the Future, 167.
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for compulsory licensing which need to prove non-working of 
the patented invention in the country or the unavailability to the 
public of the patented invention at a reasonably affordable price.30 
However, the question is whether failure to work means failure to set 
up manufacturing plant of big pharmaceutical companies in India or 
failure to disclose patented invention fully or insuffi cient transfer of 
knowledge of the technological part of the invention. The practice 
of compulsory licensing may have its drawbacks, as it may be 
diffi cult for developing countries to establish a local manufacturing 
facility capable of exploiting the invention, and foreign companies 
may be reluctant to invest in developing countries, further internal 
procedures for granting compulsory licensing might not have 
been put in place.31  The argument against   the application TRIPS 
fl exibilities such as compulsory licensing  implies to us that Indian 
legislation is going back to  the history before implementation of 
product-patent protection.,  This is because India is merely reverse-
engineering or exploiting the invention with limiting the patent 
holder rights. The discussion of the author and study on this topic 
revolves around the issue of whether the grounds of compulsory 
licensing and the 3 requirements of patentability in the Indian patent 
law are complied with as according to the TRIPS Agreement, but 
none surprisingly clearly discussed on the disclosure requirement of 
the patentee invention or whether suffi cient disclosure exist in the 
fi rst place in the patentee invention in order for India to exploit the 
invention to the development of their generic industry as patent is a 
price for disclosure which need to be given signifi cant priority in the 
TRIPS Agreement.
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: Ultimate Objective 
Promoting Technology Transfer or Merely an Exception to 
Article 27 of the TRIPS
The defi nition of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement can be 
seen as follows: Article 7 of the TRIPS states: ‘The protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
30 Kuanpoth, Rights in Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries: Major 
Challenges or the Future, 168.
31 Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS 
Agreement (New York: Rutledge Warwick Studies in Globalisation, 2002), 121.
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dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to balance of rights.32 Besides 
that, Article 8 goes further to state: “members may in formulating 
or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development provided that such measures are 
consistent with TRIPS Agreement.33 From Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, we can observe that TRIPS Agreement gives 
importance to the national interest of each respective country in 
implementing or amending their laws accordingly. The use of the 
mechanism of compulsory licensing is another alternative route to 
produce generic medicines and indicates a pre-adoption of TRIPS 
Agreement before implementation of product patent protection 
in 2005 by India, and this certainly is not an ultimate solution for 
India as should be striving for the excellence in the development 
of medical technologies in relation to the generic pharmaceutical 
industry.
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement: Another Legal Challenge 
to the Generic Industry in India
Another major legal challenge faced by India is on the issue of 
compatibility with Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement regarding to 
the patentability requirement.. According to Article 27(1) subject to 
the provisions of paragraph 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether product such as medicine and processes on 
method of producing chemical entities, in all fi eld of technology, 
provided that they are new or novelty, involves an inventive step 
as of not obvious and are capable of industrial application (must 
be useful).34 So, the question is whether the Indian Patent Act 1970 
and the Indian Patent Amendment Act 2005 by virtue of referring to 
Section 3(d) complies with Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
32 Christophe Bellmann et al., Trading In Knowledge: Development Perspectives 
on TRIPS, Trade and Sustainability (United Kingdom: Earthscan, 2003), 149. 
33 Bellmann et al., Trading In Knowledge: Development Perspectives on TRIPS, 
Trade and Sustainability, 31.
34 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm #eli-
gibility (accessed July 5, 2011)
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In relation to Section 3(d) and its effect to the domestic generic 
pharmaceutical industry, it is important to note that the same 
standard of patentability needs to be adopted without discrimination 
as to the place of the invention, the fi eld of technology and whether 
the products are imported or locally produced.35
The Validity of Section 3(d) of The Patent Amendment Act 
2005 (India) with the TRIPS Agreement: India’s Post-TRIPS 
Challenge
Firstly, looking into the amendment of Section 3 in the Patent 
Amendment Act 2005 which states explicitly that “the mere discovery 
of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known effi cacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance 
or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless 
such known process result in a new product or employs at least one 
new reactant and for the purpose of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures 
of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known 
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless 
they differ signifi cantly in properties with regard to effi cacy.”36 So 
mere discovery of a new form, or new use or new property of a 
known substance is not patentable, and the discovery of the new 
form of a known substance will be patentable only if it results in the 
enhancement of the known effi cacy of that substance. 
The word ‘effi cacy’ has created legal uncertainty and effi cacy is said 
to be shown by the improved effect in comparison with the original 
substance through objective scientifi c evidence. For example, 
existence of calcium in carbonate form is well known, discovery 
of its existence in a sulphate form would not amount to patent 
grant, unless calcium in sulphate form has an improved effect when 
compared to the carbonate form.37  Perhaps it is vital here to make 
reference to the Patent Amendment Act 2005, which states that mere 
use of a known process is not patentable unless such process results 
35 Goldstein, International Legal Materials on Intellectual Property, n. 8 at 14.
36 The Patents ( Amendment Act 2005) http::ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm 
(accessed July 3, 2011)
37 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 182. 
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in new product or employs at least one new reactant. For example, 
discovery of the use of Aspirin for treating cardiovascular diseases 
would not be patentable, if it was already being used as an analgesic.38 
The effi cacy referred to is an analgesic which is commonly used in 
aspirin (g.v) or acetylsalicylic acid, which reduces fever and relieves 
infl ammation, as well as lessening pain.39 The discovery of Aspirin 
to treat cardiovascular disease for instance, another form of usage 
of Aspirin, which in the author’s opinion also includes therapeutic 
methods for treatment of humans. As according to Article 27(3)
(a) on patentable subject matter, members may also exclude from 
patentability the diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatments of human and animals.40
Importantly, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Amendment Act 
2005 has become a landmark pharmaceutical case study which 
has caused much controversy.  The question that is much debated 
is whether Section 3(d) is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement. 
The constitutional validity and application of Section 3(d) was 
challenged by Novartis before the Madras High Court in the case of 
Novartis AG v Union of India, as in that Novartis fi led for a patent 
over Imatinib Masylate, which was a salt form of the patented 
molecule, Imatinib Masylate also called as Glivec is used for cancer 
treatment.41 Novartis challenged the Madras High Court on three 
grounds:
1) That Section 3(d) of the Patent Act 2005 is unconstitutional on 
the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India on 
the equality before the law, as it is said to discriminate against the 
pharmaceutical sector with other technology sector.
2) The new Section 3(d) is in violation of the India’s obligation as a 
signatory to the TRIPS under Article 1(1) and Article 27.
3) That Section 3(d) was vague and arbitrary that a discovery becomes 
an invention if the substance in question results in enhancement of 
known effi cacy is a very ingenious concept. 
38 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 182. 
39 See http://www.britannica.com/facts/5/213/47/aspirin-as-discussed -in-analge-
sic-drug (accessed July 8, 2011)
40 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm #eli-
gibility (accessed July 8, 2011)
41 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 182.
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To summarize, the above case was divided into three parts: 
i) patentability of Glivec; ii) the compliance of the Patents 
(Amendment) Act 2005 with TRIPS and iii) constitutional validity 
of Section 3(d) of Patents Act 1970 as amended by the Patents 
Amendment Act ( India).42 Interestingly, looking into the brilliant 
argument made by the Assistance Controller of Patents And Designs 
in the decision of the Madras High Court  on the Novartis challenge 
and upheld the validity of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 ( as 
per amended) in 2005. It was stated by the Assistance Controller of 
Patents and Designs, India being a welfare and developing country, 
which is predominantly occupied by people below poverty line, and 
has a constitutional duty to provide good health care to its citizens 
by giving them easy access to life-saving drugs. The justifi cation is 
to prevent “evergreening of a patent” by allowing generic medicine 
to be available in the market. Section 3(d) also sets an ‘obviousness 
standard’ and member states are free to defi ne the standard in a 
manner consistent with their national policy. The court also held 
that the amended section was not in violation of Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India.43 Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 as 
amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (India) does not 
discriminate against the pharmaceutical sector but only makes a 
justifi ed differentiation, given the specifi city of salt forms in the 
pharmaceutical sector as technological sectors such as mechanicals 
and electronics does not face issues arising from different salt forms.44 
Besides that, Indian Patent Amendment Act 2005 also further added 
to the non-obviousness requirement as to a technical advancement 
and economic signifi cance.45 The amendment also denies secondary 
patents unless it would therapeutically signifi cant,46 as Patent 
Amendment Bill 2005 was introduced in the Parliament in March 
2005 the objective of making the Patents Act compatible with Indian 
42 Thomas Pogge et al., Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and 
Access to Essential Medicines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 393.
43 Pogge et al., Incentives for Global Health, 393. 
44 Pogge et al., Incentives for Global Public Health, 393. 
45 Maria Comune, Health Innovation from and for the South? ‘The TRIPS 
Agreement and pharmaceutical industry in India (Germany: Lambert Academic 
Publishing, 2010), 40.
46 Comune, Health Innovation from and for the South, 40.   
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international obligations, particularly under the TRIPS.).47 Further 
Consideration on Clause 3(d) of Indian Patent Amendment Act 
2005: The Mashelkar Report state that the incremental innovations 
are sequential developments that build on the original patented 
product which may be of tremendous or signifi cant value in a 
country like India.48
Dr R.A Mashelkar, the Director General on the Council of Scientifi c 
and Industrial Research argued that many Indian companies are fi ling 
patent applications abroad for incremental innovations and also of 
the opinion that by restricting patent protection only to totally new 
molecules (new chemical entities) would deprive them of the chance 
to create intellectual property.49 However, it was well explained by 
the author that a substance obtained by mere admixture resulting 
only in the aggregation of the properties of the compounds or a 
process of producing such substance is not patentable. In contrary 
if the admixture produces a synergistic effect of properties of the 
components the substance would be patentable. For instance, an 
admixture of Ibuprofen and Paracetamol to cure pain and fever would 
not be patentable, because it is an admixture in which Ibuprofen 
and Paracetamol are aggregated and work independently on pain 
and fever. However, an admixture of Amoxycilin and Clavulonic 
acid for respiratory disorders would be patentable because the 
admixture produces a synergistic effect and results in better action 
and effi ciency.50
Furthermore, Dr Mashelkar also had drawn a distinction between 
evergreening and incremental innovation on the ground that the 
distinction between evergreening and incremental innovation. 
Evergreening refers to extension of patent monopoly achieved by 
executing trivial and insignifi cant changes to an already existing 
patented product and incremental innovations are sequential 
developments that build on the original patented product and may 
contribute signifi cant value to the country like India as stated earlier.51 
47 Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks (CGPDTM), “Report 
of the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law, http://ipindia,nic.in/ipr/patent/
patents.htm (accessed July 5, 2011).
48 M B Rao and Manjula Guru, Patent Law in India (Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2010), 39.
49 Rao and Guru, Patent Law in India, 40.
50 Kankala et al., Indian Patent Law and Practice, n. 20 at 19.
51 Rao and Guru, Patent Law in India, n. 49 at 40.
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The Dr Mashelkar technical expert committee report also stated 
that it would not be WTO compliant to limit granting of patents 
for pharmaceutical substance to new chemical entities, meaning 
that incremental innovation must be allowed.52 Although there are 
allegations that Indian patent system is too liberal in practice,53 in 
the author’s view even in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement itself it 
does not explain further on the elements of novelty or new, involve an 
inventive step and capable of industrial application. This argument is 
also well supported by paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health adopted on 14 November 2001 which 
states TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and implemented in 
a manner to protect public and to promote access of medicines to 
all and further to note on matter of fact that in Article 3 of the Doha 
Declaration it states intellectual property protection is important for 
the development of new medicines.54 This indicates to the author 
that the development of new medicines with signifi cant changes 
should be encouraged in order to achieve the objective of Article 
66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement which states that developed country 
members shall encourage knowledge in terms of medical technology 
to least-developed members in order to enable them to create a sound 
technological base.55 So in the author’s view one effective way of 
encouraging technology transfer is through suffi cient disclosure of 
the invention of the patent in order for generic companies to fully 
utilise TRIPS fl exibilities such as compulsory licensing to exploit 
the invention to meet their public health objectives. 
The question is whether the Indian Patent Amendment Act 2005 is 
not clear enough on the issue of what is not an invention. To the 
author, this is because of Article 2956 relating to conditions on patent 
applicants which states ‘members shall require that an applicant for 
a patent to disclose the invention in a manner suffi ciently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried by a person skilled in the art 
52 Rao and Guru, Patent Law in India, n. 49 at 40.
53 Rao and Guru, Patent Law in India, n. 49 at 44.
54 WT/MIN/(01)DEC/2 20 November 2001: Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: TRIPS 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindee1_trips_e.htm (accessed July 11, 
2011).
55 Goldstein, International Legal Materials on Intellectual Property, n. 8 at 32.
56 The TRIPS Agreement. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.
htm (accessed April 11, 2011).
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and may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying 
out the invention known to the inventor at the fi lling date, or where 
priority is claimed, at the priority date of the application.57 
It would suffi ce to note that Article 29 of the TRIPS states that 
inventor knowledge required on the invention is at the fi ling date and 
any signifi cant changes which occur aftermath can remain as a trade 
secret to the patentee.  This is the reason under the Indian Patent 
Amendment Act 2005 under Section 3(d), the mere incremental 
innovation without any improvement to the known substance cannot 
be patented. Importantly, looking at Article 39.3 which requires 
marketing of pharmaceutical products to utilise new chemical 
entities, the submission if undisclosed test or other data shall protect 
such data against unfair commercial use, and members shall protect 
data against disclosure, exception occurs only when necessary to 
protect the public. Article 39.3 gives further importance to the rights 
of the patent holder in terms of disclosing the invention to the public 
as ‘undisclosed data is protected under unfair commercial use.
The question is whether Article 39.3 will further reduce the effect of 
Article 29 on disclosing patentee’s invention which is an important 
provision to exploit the patentee invention to produce generic drugs. 
This can be seen when multinational companies in India disproves 
hypothesis that strong intellectual property rights are important for 
their investments in R&D.58 Through the observation in this study, 
Indian private sector started investing in R&D for developing new 
drugs since mid-1990s when TRIPS came into effect, as being new 
discovery research (NDDR) as a major objective.59 For example, 
Ranbaxy has set up its new research centre at Gurgaon and employs 
about 400 scientists, spent the largest amount of Rs2761 million 
in 2003-4 for R&D among Indian companies.60 As argued by 
PHARMA, without patent protection the ability of the MNCs to 
invest in R&D for developing new drugs will be seriously affected.61 
57 The TRIPS Agreement. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.
htm (accessed July 5, 2011).
58 Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Patent 
Protection, TRIPS and Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 159.
59 Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry, 159.
60 Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry, 160.
61 Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry, 322.
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The essential question is certainly not the need for strong patent 
system but a balanced and fl exible patent system and TRIPS 
Agreement should be an important guideline in the implementation 
of national patent legislation which adopts the agreement that will 
meet country’s public need, referring to the accessibility of medicines 
and affordability of medicines. It is also important to note after the 
Patent Amendment Act 2005, India as a member of WTO shall not 
be obliged to implement in its law a more extensive protection than 
what is required by this Agreement and members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice, as 
stated and in accordance with Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement.62 
In the author’s view, Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement refers to 
the TRIPS-PLUS obligations such as the controversy issue of 
data exclusivity and impliedly provides a defence against stronger 
intellectual property rights protection.
In summary,   the author has emphasized throughout the study the 
issue of whether Section 3(d) is consistent with Article 27.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement which prohibits discrimination as to the fi eld of 
technology63  focusing mainly on the issue of having same standards 
for pharmaceutical industry while dealing with public health 
consideration. According to the author, Section 3(d) should not be 
merely read alone with Article 27.1 without giving much attention to 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement on the limited exception to the 
exclusive rights given to the patentee.
Importantly, the author’s question is whether India is enforcing 
its patent law after product patent implementation is giving too 
much attention to pre and post grant opposition compared to fully 
utilising TRIPS fl exibilities such as compulsory licensing and Bolar 
provision. Based on the author’s observation, it would suffi ce to 
note that the three requirements of patentability and, pre and post 
grant opposition are treated in isolation with TRIPS fl exibilities. 
India is being aggressive in the pre and post-grant opposition as to 
whether it is because of the procedure to apply compulsory licensing 
62 Correa, Carlos M. 2002.  Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing 
Countries, The Trips Agreement and Policy Options. London, United States and 
Malaysia: Zed Books Third World Networks.
63 Hiroko Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS: Globalisation of Intellectual Property 
Rights and Access to Medicines (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 458. 
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is cumbersome and diffi cult at the fi rst place despite having grounds 
of compulsory licensing on anti-competitive practices, national 
working of patent and others.
Furthermore, looking at the case of Novartis v Union of India and 
Roche v Cipla,64 to prevent evergreening of patents, the author 
is of the view that the decisions of the above cases are made to 
prevent patentee from keeping signifi cant improvement of the 
patentee invention to themselves as a trade secret and disclosing 
only invention with no or less signifi cance to the current invention, 
as their justifi cation is further supported by Article 39.3 on the 
protection of undisclosed information.
Another legal challenge that India will face in the future is on 
the current issue of data exclusivity which India has to take into 
account in its legislation.. However, the TRIPS fl exibilities the 
Bolar provision or called as ‘the early working requirement’ is 
certainly an exception to the TRIPS-PLUS obligations such as data 
exclusivity. The ‘Bolar exception’ is defi ned as the early working 
requirement which permits the use of an invention relating to a 
pharmaceutical product to conduct and obtain approval from the 
health authority before the expiration of the patent for the purpose 
of commercialization of generic therapeutic equivalent just after the 
expiration of a patent or speed up the entry of generic pharmaceutical 
products.65 The signifi cance of Bolar provision can be seen in the 
case of Roche Products Inc vs Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co which 
denied the Bolar of the right to start to start FDA (Food and Drug 
Administration) approval process before the expiration of a patent.66 
Data exclusivity prohibits authorities from relying on the originator 
data for the approval of subsequent products, and effectively delays 
the development and market approval of generics.67 In the absence of 
provisions for reliance on the originator data, generic manufacturers 
would have to conduct their own clinical trials to establish the safety 
and effi cacy of pharmaceuticals drugs.68 For example, United States 
provides data exclusivity for a period of fi ve years and European 
64 Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS, 449.
65 Comune, Health Innovation from and for the South, n. 46 at 28.
66 Comune, Health Innovation from and for the South, n. 46 at 28.
67 Prabodh Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India: An Access to Medicine Perspective 
(Great Britain: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 27.
68 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, 27.
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Union (EU) since reforms in 2004 provides data exclusivity for 
8+2+1 years. For instance actual market entry of generics will only 
be allowed after ten years of the launch of the originator product. 
Consequently, if new therapeutic indications of new uses of 
originator products are authorised, data exclusivity may be extended 
for another year.69 Subsequently, TRIPS Agreement does not 
explicitly mention the word data exclusivity as the TRIPS itself is 
also vague in defi ning the position on the protection of the submitted 
data.70 Article 39.3 is not clear on how data are to be protected and 
defi nition of ‘unfair commercial use’ is not provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement.71  It has certainly caught the author’s attention when it 
was said that ambiguities in the Article have resulted in controversial 
interpretations by different parties with their own vested interests.72 
Developing countries supported by public health advocates, NGOs 
and civil society groups came up with an important affi rmation on 
data exclusivity stating that Article 39.373 amount to data protection 
and to data exclusivity.74 However, the distinction between data 
protection and data exclusivity is not given and these two different 
terms can contribute to ambiguity. Data exclusivity will certainly be 
TRIPS-PLUS obligations for India as India is preparing to modify its 
Patents Act to provide data exclusivity for fi ve years. However, India 
should bear in mind that obligation to implement provision that is 
only required by TRIPS Agreement and not those extra obligations 
such as TRIPS-PLUS provisions such as data exclusivity in order to 
subject to their bilateral/regional or free trade agreement.75
Conclusion
In conclusion, India as being the producer and exporting country, 
being a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) certainly needs 
to comply with TRIPS Agreement by amending its national patent 
law accordingly, but without neglecting the important mechanism 
69 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, 27.
70 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, 28.
71 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, 28.
72 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, 28.
73 Annex 1C Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, Article 39 
of the TRIPS http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (accessed 
April 2011).
74 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, n. 68 at 28.
75 Malhotra, Impact of TRIPS in India, n. 68 at 28.
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such as compulsory licensing and Bolar provision, which will be 
of benefi t to India to improve accessibility and affordability of 
medicines. Indian Patent Amendment Act 2005 should not just 
be a medium for pre and post-grant opposition; though it cannot 
be denied it is important to prevent evergreening of patent and 
encouraging patentee to disclose signifi cant invention. Furthermore, 
when the Managing Director and Chairman of Cipla (India’s generic 
pharmaceutical company) Dr Yusuf K Hamied, being a chemist 
himself suggested a TRIPS North and TRIPS South, where north 
comprises of 600 million people in the developed world while the 
south comprises three billion people of the Third World, India should 
apply minimal or moderation requirement of TRIPS provisions into 
its legislation to achieve public health objectives.76 The effective 
use of compulsory licensing and clear interpretation will be 
important tools as legal weapons which will certainly assist India in 
promoting technology transfer, as India should avoid undermining 
and underutilizing the compulsory licensing system just for export 
purpose or to increase the economies of scale. For instance, India 
should set Brazil compulsory licensing as a good benchmark as 
strong provisions for compulsory licensing in the Brazil patent law 
were rightfully considered an important asset in their negotiation 
with pharmaceutical industry.77 
Last but not least, amendment of the Indian Patent Law in 2005 
complying with the TRIPS Agreement for the benefi t of bilateral and 
free trade agreement and fl exibilities given in the TRIPS itself which 
is believed to benefi t generic pharmaceutical industry to improve 
accessibility and affordability of medicines, without being deceived 
into the TRIPS-PLUS obligations is a continuing legal challenge for 
India, as to get the best of both worlds is not easy as it seems. For 
instance, to implement minimum protection of intellectual property 
rights without implementing additional TRIPS obligations which is 
not mentioned in the TRIPS itself.
Interestingly, it was stated that India should resist removing any 
fl exibility because any trade agreement which will lead India 
76 See http://www.cipla.com/whatnew/news.htm (accessed March 5, 2011).
77 Basma I AbdelGafar, The Illusive Trade Off: Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation Systems and Egypt’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Policy Options 
Under TRIPS: Reality or Illusion (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 174.
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not to be able to produce and will certainly effect the rest of 
the world.78 Patent is something that is inevitable for India as being a 
member of WTO as can be seen with the implementation of product 
patent protection in 2005 to preserve their trade relations with 
other WTO members as even in TRIPS itself we cannot deny on 
the trade element which exist. One cannot prevent the use of 
patent and complying with TRIPS but India can ensure to utilize 
intellectual property rights in a minimum way accordingly for the 
development in their generic industry towards achieving public 
health objectives.
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